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FIVE YEARS AFTER BATES LAWYER
ADVERTISING IN LEGAL AND
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
ROBERT F. BODEN*
I. PREFACE: AN HISTORICAL NoTE
One of the most celebrated and important cases deter-
mined in the Supreme Court of Illinois during the formative
years of that state's jurisprudence was Illinois Central Rail-
road v. County of McLean,' decided in 1855. The case estab-
lished that counties in Illinois were without power to levy and
collect taxes upon the property of railroad corporations
chartered by the state and located within the borders of those
counties. It was a case which not only established an impor-
tant principle of law but which had a positive impact upon
the ability of Illinois railroads to expand their networks of
lines throughout the state. One of the principal attorneys for
the Illinois Central in that litigation was Abraham Lincoln,
then at the zenith of his professional career, a leading member
of the Illinois Bar and a widely known and respected trial and
appellate lawyer but five years away from the Presidency.
History teaches that Abraham Lincoln was not a man who
lightly regarded professional ethics or moral obligations of any
kind. We remember his famous advice to the young man as-
piring to the bar that he should resolve to be an honest law-
yer, and that if he could not do that, he should resolve to be
honest and not to be a lawyer. But history also teaches us how
Abraham Lincoln came to be attorney for the Illinois Central
Railroad in that famous case, and in doing so it provides us
with an insight into the attitudes of the nineteenth century
American Bar toward the subjects of advertising and
solicitation.
When the McLean County case was brewing as a result of
the efforts of the county board to tax the railroad, Lincoln
apparently discussed with county officials his representation
* Ph.B., 1950, J.D., 1952, Marquette University, LL.D., 1975, Carthage College;
member of the Wisconsin Bar; Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University.
1. 17 IM. 291 (1855).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of McLean County in the impending litigation. Then, he
wrote a letter to the county clerk of neighboring Champaign
County which read in part:
[T]he question, in its magnitude, to the Co. [sic] on the one
hand, and the counties in which the Co. [sic] has land, on
the other, is the largest law question that can now be got up
in the State; and therefore, in justice to myself, I can not
afford, if I can help it, to miss a fee altogether. If you choose
to release me; say so by return mail, and there an end. If you
wish to retain me, you better get authority from your court
[county board], come directly over in the Stage, and make
common cause with this county.2
After three weeks, having no reply, Lincoln wrote to the Gen-
eral Solicitor of the Illinois Central, saying in part:
Neither the county of McLean nor any one on it's [sic] be-
half, has yet made any engagement with me in relation to
it's [sic] suit with the Illinois Central Railroad, on the sub-
ject of taxation. I am now free to make an engagement for
the Road, and if you think fit you may "count me in."
Please write me, on receipt of this. I shall be here [on the
circuit at Pekin, Illinois] at least ten days.'
Four days later Abraham Lincoln was retained by the Illinois
Central Railroad Company.4 At any time after 1908, in proba-
bly any state of the Union, Abraham Lincoln could have been
disbarred merely upon the evidence contained in his cor-
respondence file for the McLean County case.
The example is given because it involves a nineteenth cen-
tury lawyer of unquestionable integrity and morality. At the
worst, Lincoln's preretainer activities in this case could be
barratry, solicitation or "ambulance chasing." Viewed in the
best light, they could be called examples of "direct mail" ad-
vertising. Generally speaking, twentieth century commenta-
tors have looked upon such conduct as an example of the low
ebb in professional ethics reached by American lawyers in an
era roughly described as under the influence of "Jacksonian
2. The account and the quotes from Lincoln's correspondence are from J. DUFF,
A. LINCOLN, PRAIRIE LAWYER 31 (1960).




democracy." 5 Most legal historians record a decline in profes-
sional ethics and relate it to the lowering of standards for ad-
mission to the bar associated with western expansion and the
rise of popular sovereignty following the War of 1812.0 These
views have been generally accepted by lawyers of the twenti-
eth century, schooled in the code of ethics promulgated by the
American Bar Association (ABA) in 1908.1 Therefore, it hurts
us to discover, for example, that advertising and solicitation
were tools, not just of the pettifoggers of the era, but of lead-
ers of the bar as well, including one whom hundreds of
thousands may claim as the ideal upon which American law-
yers of all generations ought to model their standards of pro-
fessional conduct and responsibility.
The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association to a considerable extent codified earlier state-
ments of ethical standards for attorneys. They were adopted
in 1908 by the ABA and, over time, came to have the force of
law in most American jurisdictions., Reacting to widespread
abuse and overreaching in the solicitation of legal business by
lawyers, the ABA Canons contained a flat prohibition against
advertising and solicitation. 9 Excepted from the prohibition
were certain customary communications of lawyers to rela-
tives, friends and clients as well as directory (as opposed to
advertising) listings in telephone books.10 Regulation extended
to law lists and to the size and type of shingles, signs and of-
fice building directory listings.1"
II. Bates AND THE PROPHECIES PRECEDING IT
Five years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court shocked the American Bar with its decision in Bates v.
5. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 265-78 (1973); . POUND,
THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQuITY TO MODERN TIMEs 223-69 (1953).
6. Id.
7. The view prevailing at mid-century is well stated in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
210-15 (1953).
8. The history is traced in H. DRINKER, supra note 7, at 23-26.
9. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908). See also subsequently
adopted Canons 40, 43 and 46. H. DRINKER, supra note 7, at 215-73, carries the origi-
nal and amended texts of these canons up to 1953 and contains a discussion of their
interpretation over the years they were in effect.




State Bar of Arizona.12 After 1908 and until Bates, it had
been an article of faith for American lawyers that the com-
mandment "Thou shalt not advertise" was at least a precept
of the essence of legal ethics, at best a principle derived from
the natural law itself. These ideas about lawyer advertising
would have been totally foreign to our professional predeces-
sors of the nineteenth century. But few of us bothered to
search behind the 1908 Code which had governed us from
then until 196913 and from which the American Bar Associa-
tion's 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility had continued
the prohibition on most advertising.1' The prevailing theory,
from 1908 to Bates in 1977, was that advertising by lawyers
was a form of solicitation of legal business, equally to be con-
demned with "ambulance chasing" and other forms of direct
or personal solicitation.15 Long before 1977, advertising had
come to be considered unprofessional conduct of the worst or-
der, and there had developed a substantial body of law and
opinion which regulated in great detail what lawyers could
and could not do in drawing the attention of the public to the
availability of their services. Since simple necessity required
some form of communication with clients, potential clients
and the public, and since the 1908 Code allowed some adver-
tising, regulation took the form of defining and listing those
things which were permitted, all as exceptions to the general
prohibition.18 Three generations of lawyers were educated on
this basis, and we were preoccupied with what is now com-
monly called a "laundry list" of permitted advertising activ-
ity. Practically no one gave serious thought to the idea that
lawyers might have, on free speech grounds, a general consti-
tutional right to advertise. We thought that lawyer advertising
certainly was subject to state regulation of sufficient breadth
to preserve high standards of professionalism in the legal com-
munity. High standards and advertising did not mix.
12. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
13. The 1908 Canons, amended and added to from time to time, were in effect for
61 years as official ABA policy for the governance of its members.
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104,
2-105 (1969).
15. See H. DRINKER, supra note 7, at 210-20.




As early as 1963, the United States Supreme Court began
to give notice that it did not regard the ethical standards of
the legal profession, even where cast in terms of law by state
supreme courts as disciplinary bodies, to be necessarily con-
trolling over rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. As the constitutional doctrine be-
gan to emerge and develop, the class protected was not the
lawyers, but rather their clients or potential clients. The
Court struck down Virginia's rules against solicitation of legal
business when the object of proposed litigation was political
expression by the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, involving the use of the court system to
enforce constitutional rights in school integration cases.17 In
rapid succession this principle was extended to include the
right of groups to assemble and inform themselves concerning
their legal rights and to receive recommendations concerning
the identity of the most qualified legal counsel to serve
them.18 These cases made it clear that the rules of legal ethics
pertaining to solicitation could not be used to prevent a wide
variety of activities by groups of clients or potential clients
and by lawyers when tied to the concept of educating people
about their rights and about the availability of lawyers to pro-
tect those rights.
At the same time, the American Bar Association was at
work rewriting its ethical code. The 1969 Code of Professional
Responsibility announced, in Canon 2, that every lawyer
"should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to
make legal counsel available."19 This Canon, like the other
eight in the 1969 Code, was cast in positive terms to meet a
general objection to the old Code that the ethical responsibili-
ties of lawyers were, almost without exception, expressed en-
tirely in prohibitory terms. Canon 2 of the 1969 Code, a very
general statement of multifaceted responsibility, covered a
number of ideas concerning how individual lawyers (as distin-
guished from the organized bar) might participate in the rec-
ognized obligation of the profession to make legal services
17. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
18. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1976); United
Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY Canon 2 (1969).
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available and accessible.2" But, while it encouraged participa-
tion in educational efforts and similar activities in its Ethical
Considerations, the new Code continued to regulate in the
"black letter" Disciplinary Rules all individual activities
which might have as their objective the attraction of legal
business. The Rules excepted only the solicitation which had
already received constitutional protection from the Supreme
Court in the cases discussed above.21 In the drafting and
adoption of the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 2, the general
principle of individual lawyer cooperation in the discharge of
the collective responsibility of making legal counsel available
obviously collided head on with the traditional prohibitions
on advertising and solicitation. The old traditions prevailed,
providing grist for the mills of bar critics, who could and did
assert that the lofty language of Canon 2 was largely meaning-
less rhetoric in its application to individual practitioners. For
all practical purposes, the individual lawyer's activity was lim-
ited to educational efforts, Law Day speeches, and the things
permitted under the 1908 Code.
The 1969 Code sought to regulate the individual lawyer's
activity in making known the need for and availability of legal
services in two ways:
1. By allowing solicitation of legal business only in those cir-
cumstances where solicitation was protected by the United
States Constitution; 2 and
2. By a continuing general prohibition of advertising which
retained most of the "laundry list" of permitted advertising
practices.23
It was this Code that attorneys John Bates and Van O'Steen
of Arizona challenged in litigation beginning in 1974 which led
to the United States Supreme Court decision of 1977.24
While their case was proceeding through the courts, the
Supreme Court was deciding other cases affecting advertising
by lawyers. In the 1975 case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State
20. Id. at EC 2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-15.
21. Id. at DR 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104.
22. Id. at DR 2-103, 2-104.
23. Id. at DR 2-101, 2-102, 2-105.
24. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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Bar 5 the Court, in striking down lawyers' minimum fee
schedules, held that there was no "learned profession" excep-
tion to federal antitrust law, leaving the clear implication that
lawyer advertising would probably be judged no differently
from commercial advertising. In an important 1976 case in-
volving restrictions on advertisements by pharmacists, the
Court held that first amendment protection extended to com-
mercial speech or advertising.26
When Bates reached the United States Supreme Court,
the Court reversed a decision for the state bar in the Supreme
Court of Arizona and held that a ban on advertising in the
Arizona Code of Professional Responsibility violated the
rights of free speech of lawyers, guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. The Court's majority opinion swept
aside arguments by the Arizona Bar that extending constitu-
tional protection to lawyer advertising would adversely affect
professionalism, would be inherently misleading, would stir up
unnecessary litigation, would unnecessarily increase the over-
head costs of the profession, would diminish the quality of le-.
gal service and would lead to difficulties of enforcement. The
Court declared that none of these concerns rose "to the level
of an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising
by attorneys. ' 27 The Court noted that it was not called upon
to "address the peculiar problems associated with advertising
claims relating to the quality of legal services .. . [which]
might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even
false."2 8 It also pointed out that the problem of in-person so-
licitation of clients was not before it.29 Noting that the states
might still regulate false, deceptive or misleading advertising
by lawyers and "that there may be reasonable restrictions on
the time, place and manner of advertising,"30 the Court
summed up its holding as follows:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the
State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appel-
lants' truthful advertisement concerning the availability and
25. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
26. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
27. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
28. Id. at 366.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 384.
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terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the flow
of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore
hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against
appellants to be violative of the First Amendment.3 1
III. LAWYER ADVERTISING IN THE PosT-Bates ERA: THE
WISCONSIN APPROACH
Bates struck the American Bar like a thunderbolt. It
erased from American legal ethics the general principle that
advertising was unprofessional and the idea that the preserva-
tion of professionalism through a prohibition on advertising,
except in specifically permitted instances, was a constitutional
means of restricting lawyers' speech. This radical departure
from old and accepted norms of conduct by lawyers raised a
chorus of protest nationwide. At the same time, critics of the
bar opined that opposition to the Bates doctrine was moti-
vated by the selfish desires of the bar "establishment" to pre-
vent young lawyers from acquiring a share of legal business
and to prevent information about the availability of legal ser-
vices from reaching the masses. While some may have held
those views, it was certainly apparent to any objective ob-
server with an appreciation for the thought processes and tra-
ditions of lawyers that most concern over Bates arose from: 1)
its repudiation of a long held and deeply rooted aversion to
the commercialism which advertising epitomizes; 2) a genuine
concern for the preservation of professional standards; 3) a
fear that the decision would be a forerunner for approval of
solicitation in general; and 4) worry concerning the impact of
advertising overhead on the cost of legal services.
Bates did not definitively fix the boundaries of state regu-
lation and control of lawyer advertising, but it did reduce to
shambles the advertising provisions of Canon 2, and it did
cast doubt upon the power of the states to control solicitation
in general. Following this decision the American Bar Associa-
tion, each of the states and the District of Columbia were put
to the task of reexamining the advertising and solicitation
rules of their codes of professional responsibility. This article
is not intended to provide a complete review of how each ju-




the prevailing notion, in the immediate post-Bates era, was to
construe the decision as narrowly as possible and rewrite the
rules preserving as much of the old tradition as could be ratio-
nalized constitutionally. This approach was manifest as early
as two months after Bates, in August, 1977, in the new lan-
guage approved for Canon 2 by the House of Delegates of the
ABA for its model or prototype Code.2 The states and the
District of Columbia in due course followed, and according to
one analysis, thirty-one of the fifty-one American jurisdictions
adopted modified advertising regulations of this type.3
One commentator noted that the majority of post-Bates
amendments of Canon 2 amounted to "unprecedented at-
tempts to regulate speech that the state knows is protected or
could be protected (by the U.S. Constitution)" and that the
actions of these courts in continuing restrictions on advertis-
ing were attempts "bordering on judicial civil disobedience.""M
While such opinions, considered in the light of the language of
Bates, seem somewhat extreme, the fact remains that most
state disciplinary authorities did indeed try to salvage as
much of the pre-Bates regulatory scheme as could be accom-
plished, while giving lip service to the constitutional right
identified in Bates. Underlying all of the post-Bates amend-
ments is the theory that Bates declared a general right to ad-
vertise, leaving to the states a regulatory power to prescribe
the form, content and forum of lawyer advertising. Since the
United States Supreme Court had not defined the scope of
state regulation, and since these courts were acting against the
backdrop of a long tradition of permissible regulation,35 it is
difficult to sustain the charge of "civil disobedience" to the
Bates rule. There was hardly a sufficiently articulated rule to
"civilly disobey. ' 36
The State Bar of Wisconsin, after a study by its Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics, came forward with a modified
"laundry list" which the State Bar presented to the supreme
32. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY - A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 54-66 (1978).
33. Andrews, The Selling of a Precedent, STUDENT LAW., Mar. 1982, at 12, 14.
34. Howard, Going About Suppressing Speech: A Comment on the Matter of
R.M.J., 26 ST. Louis U. L.J. 328 (1982).
35. H. DRINKER, supra note 7, at 210-73.
36. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
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court as a recommended amendment of Canon 2. 37 The Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin, wisely as it turned out, rejected
the modified "laundry list" approach and adopted a very sim-
ple and straight forward rule: "A lawyer may advertise the
lawyer's availability to provide legal services except use of any
advertisement which is false, misleading, deceptive or unfair
shall contitute professional misconduct."38 The court's order
contained the following comment pertaining to this rule:
Lawyers are officers of the court system, and their advertis-
ing should merit the public's confidence in and respect for
the administration of justice. The rule permits the dissemi-
nation of objective, relevant information on which a person
may base an informed selection of competent counsel. Be-
cause there presently is no state regulated plan to insure the
existence of a lawyer's specialized competence, it is mislead-
ing or deceptive to advertise that a lawyer is a specialist in a
particular field of practice other than the historically
recognized fields of patent, trademark and admiralty law. It
is permissible for a lawyer to advertise that he or she prac-
tices or does not practice in specified fields. The use of the
word "specialization" or a synonym that connotes certified
expertise is misleading or deceptive."'
The court suspended any provision of the Wisconsin Code of
Professional Responsibility which conflicted with this order.
In common with all other states, Wisconsin at the same time
provided that nothing in the order affected the prohibition in
the statutes40 on solicitation of legal business, a violation of
which the court declared would continue to constitute profes-
sional misconduct.41
The Wisconsin rule on lawyer advertising, as a response to
Bates, represented the most liberal view in the country. It put
advertising by lawyers on no different basis than advertising
generally, at the same time preserving a rigorous and strict
approach to other forms of solicitation of legal business by at-
torneys. Critics of the action of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
37. Petition by State Bar of Wisconsin to Supreme Court (Sept. 19, 1977) and
order 82 Wis. 2d xxvii (1977).
38. Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 20.08(7)(a) (1982).
39. Id. at 20.08(7) comment.
40. Id. at 20.08(8).
41. Id. at 20.08(7) comment.
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thought that the court read Bates much too broadly and that
there was no need for an "opening of the floodgates" to lawyer
advertising. The State Bar made a second attempt to have
the court adopt a "laundry list" type rule; but the court stood
firm.42
IV. DISTINGUISHING SOLICITATION FROM ADVERTISING IN THE
PosT-Bates ERA
Though the Court in Bates had expressly declared that the
holding did not extend to one-on-one or personal solicitation
of clients, 43 there was a general concern in the months imme-
diately following that the Bates doctrine might open the door
to constitutional protection of one-on-one or personal solicita-
tion of legal business on free speech or assembly grounds
without regard to the limitations imposed by the earlier
cases.4 4 This concern was put to rest, at least for these forms
of solicitation, by two cases decided by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1978.
In re Primus4 5 involved a South Carolina lawyer who was
disciplined by the state authorities for sending a letter to a
potential client soliciting participation in litigation proposed
to be conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union, with
which she was affiliated. The court said:
[T]his was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain [by
the lawyer]. Appellant was communicating an offer of free
assistance by attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an
offer predicated on entitlement to a share of monetary re-
covery. And her actions were undertaken to express personal
political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives
of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain.46
The Court held that the case was ruled by NAACP v. But-
ton 4 7 and that the state of South Carolina did not have a state
42. Petition by State Bar of Wisconsin to Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 1979) and order
88 Wis. 2d xxiv (1979).
43. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
44. United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
45. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
46. Id. at 422.
47. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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interest in the matter to which it might subordinate the con-
stitutional free speech rights of the lawyer. The application of
South Carolina's disciplinary rules relative to solicitation was,
in these circumstances, declared unconstitutional.
In the second case, Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar,8 the Court
was confronted with a classic situation of an attorney's per-
sonal solicitation of two personal injury plaintiffs and signing
them up to contingent fee contracts. The Court held that a
state can constitutionally "discipline a lawyer for soliciting cli-
ents in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely
to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent. '49
Bates was distinguished on the ground that it applied to ad-
vertising in a newspaper, which was purely speech, but that
in-person or one-on-one solicitation was commercial activity
of which speech was merely a component. The Court held that
the state did not lose its power to regulate such activity
merely because speech was a part of it, affirming the doctrine
of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.8 0 that "it has never
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written or printed."5 1 The Court also
said:
The state interests implicated in this case are particularly
strong. In addition to its general interest in protecting con-
sumers and regulating commercial transactions, the State
bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards
among members of the licensed professions. 2 The substan-
tive evils of solicitation have been stated over the years in
sweeping terms: Stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudu-
lent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential
harm to the solicited client in the form of overreaching,
overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation."
In this case the defendant conceded that the state of Ohio
had a "legitimate and indeed 'compelling' interest in prevent-
48. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
49. Id. at 449.
50. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
51. Id. at 502, quoted in Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
52. 436 U.S. at 460.
53. Id. at 461 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 65:547
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ing those aspects of solicitation that involved fraud, undue in-
fluence, intimidation, overreaching and other forms of 'vexa-
tious conduct.' "4 But he contended that, despite this
compelling interest, proof of actual damage was essential in a
disciplinary proceeding in order to overcome the free speech
immunity which he enjoyed under the first and fourteenth
amendments. The Court rejected this argument, saying:
We agree that the appropriate focus is on appellant's con-
duct. And, as appellant urges, we must undertake an inde-
pendent review of the record to determine whether that con-
duct was constitutionally protected .. . But appellant errs
in assuming that the constitutional validity of the judgment
below depends on proof that his conduct constituted actual
overreaching or inflicted some specific injury ....
Appellant's argument misconceives the nature of the
State's interests. The Rules prohibiting solicitation are pro-
phylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of
harm before it occurs. The Rules were applied in this case to
discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary
gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse con-
sequences the State seeks to avert. In such a situation,
which is inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in
adopting and enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect
the public from harmful solicitation by lawyers whom it has
licensed."
[U]nder our view of the State's interest in averting harm by
prohibiting solicitation in circumstances where it is likely to
occur, the absence of explicit proof or findings or harm or
injury is immaterial.56
Primus and Ohralick do not draw the lines separating con-
stitutionally protected solicitation from that which may be
prohibited by state codes of professional responsibility en-
forced by state action in disciplinary proceedings against at-
torneys. Such forms of solicitation approved by the Court in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and its progeny,57 are pro-
54. Id. at 462.
55. Id. at 463-64.
56. Id. at 468.
57. See supra note 18.
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tected even though pecuniary gain is one of the objectives of
the attorney. Rather, the teaching of these cases, taken with
the Railroad Trainmen line of cases is that the state contin-
ues to have a compelling interest in preventing one-on-one so-
licitation for pecuniary gain where it is not coupled with cir-
cumstances identified by the court as subordinating the
state's interest to the free speech rights of lawyers, clients and
potential clients. In short, the Ohralick Court dispelled fears
that Bates would be extended to provide constitutional pro-
tection to plain old-fashioned "ambulance chasing," and in
doing so it acknowledged that the interests of the state extend
to flat prohibitions on that activity regardless of the actual
damage done in specific instances of that form of solicitation.
V. THE R.M.J. CASE
Missouri responded to Bates in a way directly opposite to
the approach taken in Wisconsin. The Missouri Bar recom-
mended, and the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted, a modi-
fied "laundry list" of the items a lawyer might advertise. It
specified that this might be done in newspapers, periodicals
and the yellow pages of telephone directories. In addition, it
permitted lawyers to list in advertisements certain areas of
practice, requiring the exact words of the rule to be used and
also requiring a disclaimer of certification of expertise in con-
junction with any listing of specific areas of practice. 8 Mis-
souri also continued a pre-Bates restriction which limited the
mailing of professional cards to "lawyers, clients, former cli-
ents, personal friends, and relatives." 9
"R.M.J.," as he came to be known anonymously in the liti-
gation now to be discussed, graduated from law school and
was admitted to the Missouri and Illinois Bars in 1973. In
1977 he established a solo practice in St. Louis. In 1978, after
Missouri's response to Bates was in effect, R.M.J. ran several
advertisements in local newspapers and in the yellow pages,
and also sent out announcement cards. His advertisements vi-
olated the Missouri rule in three respects. First, the advertise-
ments included information not on the approved Missouri
58. Vernon's Ann. Mo. Rules, Rule 4, DR 2-101(B); Addendum H to Rule 4
(1977).
59. Vernon's Ann. Mo. Rules, Rule 4, DR 2-102.
[Vol. 65:547
LAWYER ADVERTISING
"laundry list." He included his admission in Illinois and to the
Bar of the United States Supreme Court. Second, those adver-
tisements listed areas of practice in terms other than those on
the approved list. He said "personal injury" instead of "tort
law," "real estate" instead of "property law," and he included
"contract," "zoning and land use," "communication," and
"pension and profit sharing plans," none of which were on the
list. Third, he sent his announcement cards to persons other
than "lawyers, clients, personal friends, and relatives."60 In
disciplinary proceedings brought by the Missouri authorities,
R.M.J. was issued a private reprimand by the Supreme Court
of Missouri."
The United States Supreme Court reversed this judgment,
saying:
In sum, none of the three restrictions in the Rule upon ap-
pellant's First Amendment rights can be sustained in the
circumstances of this case. There is no finding that appel-
lant's speech was misleading. Nor can we say that it was in-
herently misleading, or that restrictions short of an absolute
prohibition would not have sufficed to cure any possible de-
ception. We emphasize, as we have throughout the opinion,
that the States retain the authority to regulate advertising
that is inherently misleading or that has proven to be mis-
leading in practice. There may be other substantial state in-
terests as well that will support carefully drawn restrictions.
But although the States may regulate commercial speech,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that they do
so with care and in a manner no more extensive than reason-
ably necessary to further substantial interests. The absolute
prohibition on appellant's speech, in the absence of a finding
that his speech was misleading, does not meet these
requirements. 62
R.M.J. teaches that Bates meant what the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court supposed it to mean in adopting its rule in the
wake of Bate's. It suggests that there will be very little adver-
tising by lawyers for the states to regulate, beyond the area
announced in the Wisconsin rule declaring advertisements
60. Matter of R - M. J _, 102 S. Ct. 929, 934 (1982).
61. In the Matter of R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981), rev'd Matter of R - M.
J -, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
62. Matter of R - M. J -, 102 S. Ct. at 939.
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which are "false, misleading, deceptive or unfair" to constitute
professional misconduct."3
VI. THE END OF THE LINE FOR "LAUNDRY LISTS"
R.M.J. has sounded the death knell for "laundry list" type
regulation of lawyer advertising. The Court flatly declared
that such absolute prohibitions on speech are unconstitu-
tional. To sustain a "laundry list" type rule, a state plainly
has cast upon it the burden of showing that the prohibited
speech was misleading in fact, "inherently misleading or...
misleading in practice," or "that restrictions short of an abso-
lute prohibition would not have sufficed to cure any possible
deception."" Since it is in the nature of a rule such as this to
prohibit all advertising except that expressly authorized by
the "laundry list," the impossibility of meeting the federal
standard of constitutionality is obvious. Presumably a state
might devise a "reverse laundry list" of prohibited forms of
speech in advertising, and this may come to pass in time. In-
deed, the case-by-case handling of complaints against lawyer
advertising under a general rule such as Wisconsin's will pro-
duce a kind of "common law laundry list" of what is inher-
ently misleading, subject always to review on federal constitu-
tional grounds. But it seems safe to conclude, at this juncture,
that the type of "laundry list" to which we have become ac-
customed since 1908 is no longer viable.
VII. DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING
R.M.J. unequivocally struck down a flat prohibition on
mailing announcement cards to persons other than "lawyers,
clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives."65
There is a clear indication that some state regulation in this
area is proper, but again the Court made clear that the state
cannot take the easy flat prohibition route. In refusing to ap-
prove as constitutional the old 1908 limitation upon the per-
sons to whom such announcement could be sent, the Court
suggested that it may be necessary, to sustain such a rule, that
the state show "an absolute prohibition" to be "the only solu-
63. Id. at 938-39.




tion.' '66 At least, the Court thinks the state must show, as a
reason for restricting the recipients of such cards "an inability
to supervise" such advertising in any other way. 7 The Court
itself suggested that the institution of advance filing require-
ments and other steps might be sufficient supervision to cure
any problem connected with these forms of direct mail adver-
tising, the test being "whether the regulation. . . is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve" the state's interest. 8
It is perhaps easy, upon first reading R.M.J., to conclude
that here is a chink in a heretofore solid wall authorizing
blanket prohibition of one-on-one solicitation or "ambulance
chasing." But closer analysis reveals no indication that the
Court was intending in any way, by the language in R.M.J., to
disturb its earlier ruling in Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar.", The
R.M.J. Court was dealing with general announcement cards,
not with the specific solicitation of a particular piece of legal
business for the pecuniary gain of the lawyer-solicitor. There
is nothing in the case to suggest that the Court was contem-
plating a different rule for one-on-one written solicitation
than that already established for one-on-one oral solicitation.
It will take stronger statements than those to be found in
R.M.J., and a wholly different set of facts, to warrant a con-
clusion that the Supreme Court is any nearer to constitutional
protection for "ambulance chasing" than it was in Ohralick.
VIII. ADVERTISING THE QuALrrY OF LEGAL SERVICE AND
SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE
Along with Missouri's older and more traditional "laundry
list," its new post-Bates list of permitted subject matters for
advertising the concentration of practice came tumbling down
in R.M.J.70 The factual basis for the announcement of the
constitutional principle assumes almost comic proportions.
Missouri allowed lawyers to declare their concentration of
practice to be in "torts," but not in "personal injury," in
"property," but not in "real estate." At least this absurdly




69. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 938.
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that the lawyer-advertiser is now at liberty to describe in his
own words the area of the concentration of his practice, as
long as it is truthful and not misleading or deceptive. This
should put an end to substantial wastes of time by profes-
sional ethics committees of bar associations trying to describe,
generically or subgenerically or in whatever degree of particu-
larity, permissible areas of advertising concentration. In this
regard, the opinion speaks for itself. But the interesting ques-
tion of constitutional law which springs from R.M.J., and
which is unanswered by it, is the impact of the holding upon
the entire subject of advertising lawyer "specialization" as
that term is artfully distinguished from "concentration of
practice."
The difference between advertising a specialty and adver-
tising a concentration of practice is the difference between
claiming, in an advertisement, special expertise in a given
field of law and a mere limitation of practice under a general
license. The distinction is best illustrated by reference to the
rule now obtaining in Wisconsin. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin adopted, in the wake of Bates, a rule generally allowing
truthful advertising, but subject to the restriction contained
in the following comment to the rule:
[B]ecause there presently is no state regulated plan to in-
sure the existence of a lawyer's specialized competence, it is
misleading or deceptive to advertise that a lawyer is a spe-
cialist in a particular field of practice other than the histori-
cally recognized fields of patent, trademark and admiralty
law. It is permissible for a lawyer to advertise that he or she
practices or does not practice in specified fields. The use of
the word "specialization" or a synonym that connotes certi-
fied expertise is misleading or deceptive.7 1
The difference, therefore, between the two concepts is that
advertising a specialty, because it connotes special expertise,
is a qualitative assertion, whereas advertising a limitation or
concentration of practice is a mere quantitative assertion of a
willingness to accept retainers.
Because Missouri sought detailed regulation of what a law-
yer could say quantitatively about his practice, its rule was
71. Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 20.08(7) comment (1982).
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declared unconstitutional as an unnecessary infringement
upon free speech. This is an issue that could not have arisen
under the post-Bates Wisconsin rule which, in its commen-
tary, expressly authorizes lawyers to quantitatively describe
the limits of their practices as long as those assertions are
truthful. Nevertheless, as seen from the language of the Wis-
consin commentary, both Wisconsin and Missouri continued
an express prohibition upon the advertisement of special ex-
pertise, except in the "historically" recognized fields of intel-
lectual property and admiralty.
Part of the Missouri rule struck down in R.M.J. required
the lawyer advertising his area of concentration to state a dis-
claimer of special expertise.72 R.M.J. failed to include the re-
quired disclaimer in his ads proclaiming a concentration of
practice, and this was one of the charges in the disciplinary
proceedings against him.7' However, this fourth charge of pro-
fessional misconduct was not litigated at the level of the
United States Supreme Court, because R.M.J. made no claim
that this portion of the Missouri rule was unconstitutional. 4
Thus, the decision in R.M.J. does not answer, as indeed it
could not, the most significant question of constitutional law
which can possibly arise in the post-Bates era. The issues in
R.M.J. pale in comparison, and the resolution of this question
may chart the course for the legal profession well into the
twenty-first century. Even as liberal a rule as that prevailing
in Wisconsin restricts a lawyer from being the judge of his
own expertise and from advertising the same; the Wisconsin
court's commentary draws an inference that a declaration of
special expertise, in the absence of a state-sponsored plan of
certifying specialists, "is misleading or deceptive. ' 75 The is-
sue which arises under an approach such as this is: Does a
lawyer have a constitutionally protected right of commercial
free speech to truthfully advertise the quality of his legal ser-
vices and his special expertise in particular fields of law even
where no state-sponsored system for the testing and certifica-
tion of legal specialists has been adopted?
72. Vernon's Ann. Mo. Rules, Rule 4, DR 2-101(B); Addendum IH to Rule 4
(1977).
73. 102 S. Ct. at 929.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 938, n.18.
75. Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 20.08(7) comment (1982).
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This is a constitutional question of first impression. Start-
ing from the present posture of constitutional doctrine in this
field, there are two diametrically opposed yet almost equally
logical answers to this question. On the one hand, the United
States Supreme Court might say that a truthful advertise-
ment of special expertise is constitutionally protected even if
the state has no machinery for testing and certifying special-
ists. In one sense, this would be but a small step forward
from the Court's present extension of such protection in Bates
and R.M.J. Such a holding would amount to a declaration by
the Court, following the test laid down in R.M.J., 7  that a
state could not justify a total suppression of commercial
speech about the special expertise of a lawyer because such a
regulation was "more extensive than is necessary to serve" the
state's interest in limiting specialty advertisements to truly
qualified specialists. This was the test applied in the case of
direct-mail advertisements in R.M.J.7 8  The obvious alterna-
tive in the case of specialist advertisements, far less drastic in
terms of suppressing speech, is state adoption of a plan for
testing and certifying specialists who could then be authorized
to advertise their specialties, all others being excluded upon
grounds that found constitutional support in the earlier
cases.
7 19
The adoption of this principle of constitutional law would
obviously force the states to adopt plans for the testing and
certification of specialists in the law. The price for not doing
so would be to put each lawyer at liberty to judge his own
level of special expertise and to advertise it. The only control
would be in disciplinary proceedings where the issue would be
whether or not the asserted possession of special expertise was
misleading or deceptive.
The wisdom of forcing plans for specialization upon the
states in this fashion will be hotly debated. The opponents of
de jure recognition of specialities will argue that even the ar-
ticulation of a constitutional right to advertise de facto pos-
session of special expertise is not a sufficient reason to adopt a
76. 102 S. Ct. at 939.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. In the Matter of R.I M. J_ 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982); Ohralick v. Ohio State
Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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formal plan for specialization because disciplinary machinery
exists to deal with transgressions of advertising rules. Propo-
nents of plans for specialization will argue that the recogni-
tion of a constitutional right to advertise the de facto posses-
sion of special expertise demands, in the public interest, a
systematic regulation of who can be termed a specialist.
The United States Supreme Court could avoid forcing
upon the states decisions with respect to the adoption of plans
for specialization by resolving the issue of a constitutional
right to advertise de facto expertise in a different way. It
could follow the approach it took in Ohralick v. Ohio State
Bar,8" where it recognized that the regulation of solicitation
was more than a matter of "protecting consumers and regulat-
ing commercial transactions" because it bore upon the state's
"special responsibility for maintaining standards among mem-
bers of the licensed professions .... 81 In this vein the
Court might recognize that, in reaching the question of adver-
tising de facto possession of special expertise, it was entering,
as it did in Ohralick, a field involving more than mere speech.
In Ohralick, the field was one-on-one solicitation for pecuni-
ary gain; in the instant matter it would be the entire area of
state licensure of attorneys, from the resolution of the policy
question concerning recognition of specialties, to the selection
and definition of those specialties, and finally to the plan for
testing and certifying such specialists. Following the rationale
of Ohralick, the Court might conclude that these were policy
questions best left to the states and that the adoption of certi-
fication plans is not, at this point in the history and develop-
ment of the legal profession, a viable alternative to flat prohi-
bition of commercial speech concerning individual lawyers'
possession of de facto special expertise. It could then conclude
that prohibition was not a form of regulation more extensive
than necessary, at the present time, to serve the states' inter-
est in protecting the public from the evils of misleading or
deceptive advertising concerning special expertise.
Which way the Court will go on this issue is anybody's
guess in the spring of 1982. In R.M.J. the Court showed a
strong interest in protecting the free speech rights of the law-
80. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
81. Id. at 460.
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yer in defining for himself the areas of his concentration of
practice. Conversely, in Ohralick, the Court showed an
equally strong interest in protecting the rights of the state to
regulate the licensed professions when the individual lawyer's
speech became enmeshed with other matters relating to licen-
sure. The issue over advertising de facto possession of special
expertise calls for an even more delicate balance of individual
and public rights than encountered in any of the previous
cases. The better of the two approaches would seem to be the
latter, favoring the continued prohibition of advertising of
special expertise, pending the resolution of all the trouble-
some questions surrounding the certification of specialists in
the legal profession. These are issues which cannot be decided
instantly in response to a sudden declaration from the United
States Supreme Court that a constitutional right to advertise
expertise exists which can be effectively channelled and con-
trolled through a certification plan. The recent history of the
response to Bates should be proof enough of this, and the bar
faces, in the issue of specialization, a far more difficult issue
than any connected with its handling of the problems faced as
a result of Bates.
IX. AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE UPON THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING
The profession has suffered over the past nineteen years
from a long line of constitutional decisions about lawyer ad-
vertising and solicitation. This is not to judge that those deci-
sions were wrong or unnecessary, but only to assert that this
series of developments has left many lawyers of good will and
good faith wondering whether the underpinnings of profes-
sionalism were being knocked out from under the American
Bar in the name of the constitutional rights of clients and
some colleagues. There is no reason for any lawyer to fear
that these constitutional decisions, or the changes in the rules
brought about as a result of these decisions, have adversely
affected lawyers' ethics as that term ought to be understood.
We have for a long time confused the law governing the
manner in which we practice with the principles of ethics.
Perhaps this is the natural result of the legal positivism which
has pervaded legal education and the practice for a good por-
tion of the twentieth century. The 1908 Code, while not ex-
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pressly declaring itself to be a set of ethical principles, was
nevertheless denominated Canons of Professional Ethics,82
and in time came to be regarded as a statement of principle
rather than of law. The word "Ethics" was taken out of the
1969 Code, and an effort was made in its text to differentiate
between "ethical considerations" and "disciplinary rules."' 3
However these rules were denominated in the past, and for
that reason, lawyers have come to think of the rules of the
prevailing code as the principles of ethics. The Kutak Com-
mission, by attempting to rewrite a code for the American Bar
Association in the 1980's, is trying (perhaps too hard) to write
a set of rules which will be merely rules of professional
conduct.8 4
The job of the American lawyer, facing the incursions of
constitutional law into his old set of rules as well as the efforts
of the Kutak Commission to write ethical considerations out
of the new Code, is to realize and understand that the body of
doctrine under which we have been operating, whether the
1908 version or the 1969 version, was a "mixed bag." Of
course there are principles of ethics to be found in the old and
the present Code, as well as in anything being offered by the
Kutak Commission. But a great deal of what appears in those
codes in "black letter" rules represents legislation which is
morally indifferent.
The rules of advertising, or such of them as remain, need
to be distinguished from principles of ethics relating to adver-
tising by lawyers. We can no longer disguise all of those rules
as principles of ethics. The Supreme Court itself recognized
this in Bates, saying:
It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of
etiquette and not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great
Britain viewed the law as a form of public service, rather
than as a means of earning a living, and they looked down
on "trade" as unseemly .... Eventually, the attitude to-
ward advertising fostered by this view evolved into an aspect
of the ethics of the profession .... But habit and tradition
are not in themselves an adequate answer to a constitutional
82. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
83. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT (Proposed Final Draft 1982).
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challenge. In this day, we do not belittle the person who
earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his
mind. Since the belief that lawyers are somehow "above"
trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation
for the advertising restraint has crumbled. 5
The rules declared unconstitutional in Bates and R.M.J.
were not, by virtue of placement in a code of professional re-
sponsibility, made into principles of ethics. Bates and R.M.J.,
have left our professional regulation of the morals of advertis-
ing quite intact, probably stronger, and certainly more visible
than heretofore. Until recently that regulation was barnacled
over by more than seventy years of attempts to define "habit
and tradition." Consider the Court's summation in R.M.J. of
the current state of the law:
Commercial speech doctrine, in the context of advertising
for professional services, may be summarized generally as
follows: Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But
when the particular content or method of the advertising
suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience
has proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse,
the states may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading
advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the states may
not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of poten-
tially misleading advertising, e.g., a listing of areas of prac-
tice, if the information also may be presented in a way that
is not deceptive.... Although the potential for deception
and confusion is particularly strong in the context of adver-
tising professional services, restrictions upon such advertis-
ing may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent
the deception.86
Those are not the words of a court attempting to subvert
moral or ethical principle in order to extend constitutional
protection to a form of speech. They are words which enshrine
the true moral principle in a constitutional doctrine and ex-
tend its protection to our efforts at preventing misleading or
deceptive advertising. The ancient injunction, expressed in
the Judeo-Christian tradition as "Thou shalt not bear false
85. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977) (citations omitted).
86. 102 S. Ct. at 937.
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witness,"8 not only remains intact but emerges, when applied
to lawyer advertising, with a constitutional stamp of approval.
In this, as in all things pertaining to changes rapidly occur-
ring in the profession and to the criticism and clamor which
swirl about it, we must individually devise plans which will
preserve our pride in being lawyers and our devotion to pro-
fessional ideals. This may have been easier for our predeces-
sors than it is for those of us who live and practice in the
1980's. We must not let the stripping away of some of the
trappings of professionalism, as we were used to them, lead us
to despair or to the conclusion that professionalism has been
lost. Observing the wreckage of the elaborate system devised
over the past seventy-five years to regulate in detail the sub-
ject of advertising, there is a greater danger in this, than in
other areas of change, that some who revere the professional
image of the lawyer and whose support is essential to continue
it, may lose faith. This cannot be allowed to happen. The legal
profession can no more afford the loss of professional idealists
because of a change to morally indifferent rules regulating ad-
vertising than the Catholic Church could afford to lose a large
segment of the faithful because of the change in the time-
honored rules of fast and abstinence.
X. CONCLUSION
We are entering a new era in which the regulation of law-
yer advertising will center around questions concerning its
truthfulness as distinguished from its conformity to "laundry
lists" of varying types. Enforcement will deal with substance
rather than form. To the degree that our grievance commit-
tees and judicial enforcement bodies are overworked and un-
derstaffed, much will depend upon voluntary compliance.
This, coupled with five years of hindsight since Bates, calls to
mind the following from that Court's opinion:
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of ad-
vertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal pro-
fession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its mem-
bers will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort. We
suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will behave as
they always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths to
87. Exodus 20:16 (Douay-Rheims).
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uphold the integrity and honor of their profession and of the
legal system. For every attorney who overreaches through
advertising, there will be thousands of others who will be
candid and honest and straight forward. And, of course, it
will be in the latter's interest, as in other cases of miscon-
duct at the bar, to assist in weeding out those few who abuse
their trust.8
That prophecy seems to have been borne out at least in
the geographic area where this writer has had an opportunity
to observe the advertising of the bar. With a few spectacular
exceptions, there has been very little advertising of which to
be ashamed, even though many of us might prefer to see none
of it beyond neat rows of names and addresses, all in regular
size type, in the telephone directory.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new-found lib-
erty of lawyers to advertise may prove in time to be one of the
most effective vehicles for meeting the moral obligation de-
scribed in Canon 2 of the 1969 Code as the responsibility of
every lawyer to "assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty
to make legal counsel available."89 That is a noble objective
and one which can and ought to inspire us even as we attempt
to adjust our views of legal ethics and of the customs and tra-
ditions of the profession to newly enunciated constitutional
doctrine.
88. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977).
89. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1969).
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